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An account of the development of temporal understanding is proposed which
links such understanding with the development of episodic memory. We distinguish
between different ways of representing time in terms of the kinds of temporal frame-
works they involve. Distinctions are made between frameworks that are perspectival
or nonperspectival and those that represent recurrent sequences or particular times.
Even primitive temporal understanding integrates both perspectival and nonperspec-
tival components. However, since early frameworks are event-based and localized,
they are not yet sufficient for episodic memory in that they do not enable the child
to think of events as having occurred at particular points in time. We describe the
emergence of new kinds of frameworks in terms of the development of temporal
decentering. Two levels of temporal decentering are distinguished, with the higher
level involving an appreciation of how event representations depend on one’s tem-
poral perspective. ª 1999 Academic Press
The aim of this paper is to give an account of the development of temporal
understanding by detailing the different kinds of representational frame-
works used in children’s reasoning about time at different developmental
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stages. Giving such an account is important since we believe that the devel-
opment of episodic memory depends upon the acquisition of a specific kind
of temporal understanding, namely, possession of the concept of particular
past times. There are four sections to the paper. The first briefly discusses
accounts of episodic memory and their developmental implications. It is ar-
gued that developmentalists have overlooked the fact that the ability to think
of particular, unique times is a defining feature of episodic memory. Defining
episodic memory in this way helps articulate what underpins some of our
intuitions about what is measured by various kinds of memory tasks. If this
definition is correct, then a full account of memory development should ex-
plain how developing temporal understanding enables new ways of remem-
bering information. However, as yet there are few detailed accounts of how
the ability to represent and conceptualize time develops (see Nelson, 1996,
for this point).
As developmentalists, we need to ask ‘‘What other, more primitive, ways
of representing time may there be, other than the ways we as adults have?’’
In the second and third sections, existing psychological accounts of temporal
representation, together with distinctions philosophers have made between
different ways of ordering events in time, are used to set out different frame-
works for representing the temporal location of events. The first key distinc-
tion is between frameworks that are intrinsically perspectival and ones which
are not, and a second important distinction is between frameworks that locate
events with respect to recurrent temporal features and frameworks that assign
events unique locations in time.
In the last section, the notion of temporal decentering is used to capture
the nature of mature representational abilities involved in episodic memory.
The ability to temporally decenter is the ability to consider alternative tempo-
ral perspectives on events and to understand the relationship of these perspec-
tives to one’s current perspective. We distinguish between two different lev-
els of temporal decentering, one of which involves possession of the concept
of a temporally extended self (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996).
EPISODIC MEMORY
Definitions of Episodic Memory
The concept of episodic memory has heavily influenced long-term mem-
ory research over the last two decades, although the interpretation of the term
has undergone significant changes. The concept was originally introduced to
describe a specialized memory subsystem for receiving and storing a particu-
lar kind of information, namely, ‘‘information about temporally dated epi-
sodes or events, and temporal–spatial relations among these events’’ (Tulv-
ing, 1972, p. 385). Tulving’s further claim that these episodes or events are
stored in terms of their ‘‘autobiographical reference’’ to other contents of
episodic memory had less influence on empirical and neuropsychological
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research, and, typically, episodic memory has been examined using tasks
which require recognition or recall of word lists rather than tasks involving
personal life events.
Thus, many psychologists have assumed that what is distinctive about
episodic memory is that it involves retrieval of events along with contextual
information. However, the nature of such information is not clear: In particu-
lar, this information cannot plausibly be the temporal dates of events, given
what is known about temporal encoding processes in long-term memory.
Although some researchers have claimed that the dates or times of all events
are tagged automatically (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Zacks, Hasher, Alba,
Sanft, & Rose, 1984), there is little supportive evidence for the existence of
such a coding process, at least outside the range of short-term memory. In
laboratory tasks, encoding and retrieving temporal information is an effortful
process (Naveh-Benjamin, 1990), and judgments of temporal location may
be made inferentially on the basis of nontemporal information (Hintzman,
Block, & Summers, 1973; Guenther & Linton, 1975). In studies on memory
for life-events, exact dates are rarely retrieved (e.g., Burt, 1992; Friedman,
1987), and dates are poor retrieval cues (Wagenaar, 1986). It appears that
if temporal information is encoded at all, it is easily forgotten, even when
memory for other aspects of events is intact (Friedman, 1993). In the light
of such findings, it is clear that the term episodic memory cannot be restricted
to temporally dated memories. In practice, the term tends to be used for event
memories which are assumed to include some, usually unspecified, kind of
contextual information (see Davies & Thomson, 1988, for discussion of con-
text in memory).
Indeed, in his own work, Tulving has increasingly stressed the self-
referential or self-conscious component of episodic memory, rather than the
information it involves (Tulving, 1983, 1985). This is particularly clear in
Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving’s (1997) recent theoretical account of episodic
memory and frontal functioning, in which episodic memory is discussed in
terms of the particular kind of experience or awareness associated with it.
Episodic memory is described in terms of the involvement of a specific ca-
pacity for self-conscious reasoning defined as autonoetic consciousness, or
‘‘the ability to mentally represent and become aware of [one’s] experiences
in subjective time’’ (p. 349). This is contrasted with the noetic awareness
which accompanies semantic memories that involve knowledge retrieval but
not the reexperiencing of one’s personal past. In fact, Wheeler et al. explicitly
reject the idea that episodic memory is a specialized subsystem which stores
particular kinds of contextual information: ‘‘Virtually any category of infor-
mation can be, in principle, represented in and its retrieval mediated by,
semantic memory, including knowledge of source and contextual informa-
tion. . . To tap into autonoetic consciousness, a test must require a remem-
berer to contemplate some past personal event directly as it was subjectively
experienced.’’ (p. 338).
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There has been considerable debate over whether young children or infants
can be said to have episodic memory, particularly in the light of the results
of studies employing new methodologies, such as deferred imitation or rein-
forcement techniques (Bauer & Mandler, 1989, 1992; Meltzoff, 1990;
Rovee-Collier, 1997). Numerous deferred imitations studies have shown that
infants can reproduce an action sequence of up to four elements that they
have observed an adult perform on a single occasion, even after a delay of
two weeks (see Bauer, 1995, for review). Whether one wants to describe
such early memory abilities as episodic memory depends, of course, upon
the definition given of episodic memory. In particular, the claim that such
memory is self-conscious has been thought to have important developmental
implications. Perner (1990, 1991, in press) has pointed out that this self-
consciousness can be thought of as a particular kind of theory of mind under-
standing. He has argued that below four years, children lack the conception
of mental states necessary to think of their past experiences as the origins
of their memories. Thus, the suggestion is that children of this age do not
have autonoetic consciousness, and, hence, do not have episodic memory.
This, Perner has argued (Perner & Ruffman, 1995), can also explain the
phenomenon of childhood amnesia, the inability of adults to remember very
early childhood events (Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982; Wetzler &
Sweeny, 1986).
Episodic Memory and the Concept of Particular Times
The description of episodic memory as involving a self-conscious activity
has interesting developmental implications. However, we believe that it is
important not to overlook a different aspect of such memories, an aspect
which is implicit in Tulving’s (1972) original description. Although it may
have been misleading to describe episodic memories as ‘‘temporally dated,’’
episodic memories do seem to involve a special way of thinking about time.
Specifically, such memories involve thinking of events as having occurred
at particular, unique times. This characteristic of episodic memories has re-
ceived less attention, but it is clearly also of special relevance from a devel-
opmental perspective, since it may be asked when this kind of thought be-
comes available to young children. The mature thinker is obviously capable
of thinking of events as having happened at particular times: Even under
circumstances in which a type of event occurs repeatedly (e.g., traveling to
work every day), adults are able to consider individual, temporally distinct,
occurrences of the event and indeed to think about their temporal relations
to each other. We view representing an event as having happened at a particu-
lar time in the past as a defining characteristic of episodic memory. Our
claim is that young children do not have the concept of particular times, the
concept which enables one to distinguish between any given occurrence of
an event and other occurrences of similar events at other times.
In focusing on this aspect of episodic memory, the aim is not to revive
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the idea that episodic memories are always temporally dated or involve the
retrieval of precise temporal information. As mentioned above, even as
adults, we often remember events but have difficulty judging when they oc-
curred. However, when this happens to us, we still believe there is a fact of
the matter as to at what particular time the event occurred. Indeed, we often
try to work out this particular temporal location, for example by making
inferences using other contextual information (e.g., what the weather was
like, who was there, etc.). Young children’s understanding of time does not
allow them to grasp that, for any event, there is such a particular, unique
temporal location.
Although the suggestion that young children do not have a concept of
particular times and, therefore, do not have episodic memory, has not been
made explicit in the literature, similar intuitions seem to have influenced
others’ interpretations of early memory abilities. For example, Perner (in
press), in his discussion of deferred imitation, pointed out that ‘‘delayed
imitation that is based on a single event . . . should not be equated with a
memory (knowledge) of that event as [italics added] a single past event.’’
While deferred imitation tasks show that young children may be able to in-
clude temporal information in their representations of action sequences in
the sense of being able to retain information about the temporal sequence
in which elements occur, this information may be generic, rather than event-
specific. Generic information here means information about a temporal struc-
ture numerically different event sequences may have and which, therefore,
does not distinguish between one event sequence and another. Even if a child
is recalling information acquired in a single episode, this information may
still be generic. As will be discussed below, the question as to whether a
child has genuine episodic memories can be raised even if she is responding
verbally using past tense morphology. In this case, an attribution of episodic
memory still depends upon a consideration of the type of temporal under-
standing subserving her use of the past tense.
Few memory theorists would disagree with the basic distinction between
episodic and generic memory, and indeed, much research on children’s mem-
ory narratives has been aimed at disentangling recall of specific past episodes
from recall of scripts (e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1990). However, we believe
that for this distinction to be meaningful, it is necessary to give a develop-
mental account of the particular kinds of temporal understanding which
allow the child to single out the remembered event as a unique occurrence. At
the moment, there is little work in psychology which distinguishes between
different kinds of temporal understanding, and existing work on the develop-
mental psychology of time has not tended to address this kind of issue. Thus,
this paper aims to provide a new developmental account of temporal under-
standing by drawing on existing work on memory and language develop-
ment, together with general considerations from the philosophy of time and
memory.
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Temporal Frameworks
In what follows, the notion of temporal frameworks will be employed in
providing a developmental account of temporal understanding. The notion
of a framework or frame of reference has been used extensively in the field
of spatial cognition (Eilan, McCarthy, & Brewer, 1993). The spatial location
of an object can be specified in many different ways, such as ‘‘to the right’’
or ‘‘by the table’’ or at a given degree of longitude and latitude. To talk
about different frameworks here is a way of capturing what, for example,
is in common between all representations of places involving terms such as
‘‘to the right’’ and‘‘to the left’’ and how they differ, say, from representa-
tions of places specified in terms of longitude and latitude. In each case, a
different kind of framework is involved. Similarly, different kinds of frame-
works may be involved in specifying the temporal location of an event: For
example, an event could be described as occurring on a given date, or at a
particular time of day, or as so many days from the present, or as occurring
before or after another landmark event, and so on.
A framework is involved in someone’s reasoning whenever they have a
representation of a domain that can be used to integrate information about the
locations of objects or events in this domain. Orienting oneself in a domain
(Friedman, 1990), i.e., determining one’s own position relative to other ob-
jects or events in the domain, requires a framework, as does determining the
relative locations which objects or events in a domain occupy with respect
to each other, independently of where oneself is located. Having a framework
does not necessarily require that for any two objects or events one is actually
able to determine their relative locations. Frameworks can be localized. That
is to say, they may allow one to determine locations with respect to some
objects or events, but not with respect to others. What is crucial to a frame-
work, however, is that it has a certain amount of flexibility. A framework
is not just a representation of the relative locations of individual objects or
events; it must also allow one to determine one’s own location relative to
at least some of these objects or events, even if one’s location varies. Or it
must allow the location of newly encountered objects or events to be deter-
mined with respect to the location of at least some objects or events one
already knows about. In the following sections, different kinds of temporal
frameworks will be described and used to give an account of the development
of temporal understanding. We hope that, in describing the ways in which
frameworks can vary, some developmentally primitive ways of representing
time can be captured.
PERSPECTIVAL AND NONPERSPECTIVAL REPRESENTATION
OF TIMES
Theories of spatial representation often make a distinction between ego-
centric, or perspectival, and allocentric, or nonperspectival, representations
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of space (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Pick & Lockman, 1981). A perspectival
representation, in this sense, is one which locates entities in a framework
which depends on one’s own spatial position, whereas a nonperspectival rep-
resentation locates entities in a framework which is independent of one’s
own spatial position. Philosophers, following McTaggart (1927), have drawn
a similar distinction between two ways of ordering events in time. The so-
called A-series is the series of positions running from the past, through the
present, to the future. Typical linguistic counterparts of A-series determina-
tions are terms such as ‘‘now,’’ ‘‘yesterday,’’ and ‘‘in a short while,’’ the
correct use of which depends on when they are uttered. Assigning an event
a position in the A-series depends on one’s own position in time. The A-
series can thus be seen as a framework for perspectival temporal representa-
tions which locate events in virtue of the temporal relations in which one
stands to them. This is different from assigning an event a position in the
so-called B-series, the series running from earlier to later. The correct use
of the linguistic counterparts of B-series determinations—terms such as ‘‘be-
fore’’ and ‘‘after’’ or dates—does not depend on when they are uttered. An
event can be described as happening before or after another event, or both
events can be described as happening on certain dates, independently of
where in time one is located relative to them. In contrast to the A-series,
the B-series can thus be seen as a framework for nonperspectival temporal
representations.
For developmentalists, the distinction between perspectival and nonper-
spectival temporal frameworks raises a number of important issues. In partic-
ular, it may be asked whether the two frameworks develop independently
of each other, whether one of them is developmentally prior, and when they
become integrated to give a mature understanding of time. However, the
difficult empirical issue is inferring the nature of children’s temporal frame-
works from particular kinds of behavior. Unlike in the case of spatial repre-
sentations, where grasp of particular spatial relationships can be manifested
in spatial behavior—e.g., in object retrieval or spatial navigation—it is un-
clear what kinds of behavior would manifest possession of particular kinds
of temporal frameworks. Existing empirical research which seems to have
the most bearing on these issues lies in the field of language acquisition,
particularly work on the acquisition of tense and temporal terms.
Nonperspectival Temporal Frameworks: Scripts
An influential and intuitively plausible claim that has emerged from devel-
opmental work on spatial representation holds that perspectival frameworks
are developmentally prior to nonperspectival frameworks. This claim has its
origins in the Piagetian framework, in which many of the young child’s cog-
nitive limitations are described in terms of egocentrism of thought. However,
it is not clear that intuitively we might want to make the same claims about
developmental priority when it comes to temporal frameworks. In fact, it
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may seem more plausible to claim that, in the case of temporal frameworks,
nonperspectival frameworks develop first. One way in which this claim could
be framed is in terms of the developmental priority of scriptlike knowledge
over thought about past and future events. A script can be thought of as
nonperspectival insofar as it is a representation of what normally happens:
Scripts are usually told in the timeless present tense, and they typically con-
cern recurrent features in a child’s life such as seeing a doctor, going to a
birthday party, or eating in a fast-food restaurant (Nelson, 1986; Schank &
Abelson, 1977).
Scripts function as frameworks in that they provide ways of representing
the location of novel events in time. Thus, a child who has formed a script
of a particular kind of sequence may be able to recognize a newly occurring
sequence as falling under that script even if (a) it contains a new element,
(b) one of its elements is substituted by a different element, or (c) one of
the elements is missing. Such a child would be able to represent, say, an
unexpected element encountered within the sequence as standing in a certain
temporal relation to other elements in the sequence, and to code it as an
option. Possession of script knowledge seems to require some ability to dis-
tinguish between the position within a series at which a certain event happens
and the particular event that happens at this position. It is by being variable
in this sense that scripts can be counted as providing a framework, although
this may not be the case for, say, the representations involved in deferred
imitation. Deferred imitation of action sequences may involve representa-
tions of a much simpler kind which may not allow for such variations to
occur. With such representations of action sequences, the only way the child
has of representing a new variant of a familiar sequence is by forming a
completely new representation. In this case, sequences can only be repre-
sented as a whole with a fixed set of elements, and, therefore, the resulting
representations cannot be said to provide a framework in which other ele-
ments could occur.
A considerable body of research has shown that children acquire script-
knowledge at a very early age and extract scripts after even a small number
of experiences of an event sequence (e.g., Fivush, 1984; Hudson & Nelson,
1986; Nelson, 1986; Nelson & Hudson, 1988; Nelson & Ross, 1980). This
may suggest that scripts are good candidates for developmentally early non-
perspectival representational frameworks. Script knowledge, while being
based on past experience of the kinds of events mentioned in the script, does
not seem to locate the events in a perspectival framework. When questioned
about specific events, young children will tend to give a scriptlike account
in reply, often in the present tense (Fivush & Hamond, 1990). Scripts can
be thought of as nonperspectival in the sense that they do not locate events
with respect to the current point in time at which one is located. Rather, they
describe the sequence of events relative to each other: In this sense, they are
like the B-series.
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Nevertheless, there are theoretical considerations which may prevent con-
cluding on the basis of early script use that nonperspectival frameworks are
developmentally prior. It is at least arguable that use of scripts requires some
form of perspectival representation. We have suggested that scripts may pro-
vide a way of locating events in a nonperspectival framework which codes
their relation to other events which occur in a familiar sequence. However,
the comparison with spatial representations indicates that we should gener-
ally be wary of thinking that nonperspectival representations, by themselves,
could be sufficient for an understanding of the location of events in time
(Friedman, 1990). Our grasp of space does not just depend on having nonper-
spectival knowledge (e.g., a cognitive map), but also on the way in which
this knowledge can be put to use in the situation we are actually in. Maplike
representations are only useful to us if we are able to determine which map
depicts the current array, to determine the position on the map where we are
currently located, and to track our movements on the map. In other words,
grasp of spatial location depends on the ability to integrate nonperspectival
with perspectival ways of thinking about the same space.
Similarly, a scriptlike representation will only be useful to a child who is
able to recognize a present situation as falling under a script she already
possesses and who is able to keep track of the successive stages of the se-
quence of events as they unfold. In other words, even using a script requires
some grasp of one’s current temporal location, and thus an ability to integrate
the nonperspectival framework provided by the script with a perspectival
framework. As will be shown below, there may be different ways in which
such an integration may be achieved, and, correspondingly, different levels
of sophistication in overall representational abilities. For the moment, it can
be noted that, even though some perspectival representation is required to
use a script, this perspectival knowledge may initially be quite primitive. In
particular, while the acquisition of script knowledge may be based on a num-
ber of past experiences of occurrences of a sequence, the child’s representa-
tional abilities may fall short of representing the relations between those
different occurrences. This suggests that, early in development, children may
be able to track their own position within a sequence, but are unable to locate
the event sequence as a whole with respect to other occurrences of sequences
of the same type (or, indeed, occurrences of other kinds of sequences).
Perspectival Temporal Frameworks: The Aspect-Before-Tense Debate
In the field of developmental psycholinguistics, several claims have been
made about children’s concepts of time based on their use of tensed forms
of verbs and temporal terms. They can be seen as claims about the develop-
ment of perspectival temporal frameworks, as shall now be shown. Using
the correct tense of a verb shows a sensitivity to the relationship between
the time the sentence is uttered (the speech time) and the time of the reported
event (the event time), which may be different. As such, it indicates an ability
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on the part of the mature speaker to transcend the boundaries of the ‘‘here
and now’’ of the speech context (Sachs, 1989), and to capture events happen-
ing at different times in their relation to his or her temporal perspective.
One of the most influential theories of tense is due to Reichenbach (1947).
He recognized the existence of a third element in the mature speaker’s use
of tense which mediates between speech time and event time: reference time.
Reichenbach saw reference time as a necessary ingredient of all tenses, but
the role played by reference time can be made particularly clear by a consid-
eration of the pluperfect. A sentence such as ‘‘Peter had gone’’ denotes a
situation which lies at a time in the past, but this time is not as far back in
the past as the event of Peter’s leaving. Thus, the sentence introduces a time
(reference time) which does not coincide with either speech time or event
time. In order to understand the sentence, the hearer must consider a temporal
perspective other than the present. In other words, the interpretation of a
sentence like ‘‘Peter had gone’’ has to consider not only the speaker’s actual
vantage point, the speech time, but also another vantage point the speaker
has in mind, the reference time, which lies after the time of the event of
Peter’s leaving but before the speech time.
Developmental accounts of the acquisition of tense have argued for vari-
ous ways in which the representational abilities that underpin early use of
tense morphology may be thought to fall short of the full-blown grasp of
tense described by Reichenbach. One assumption commonly made in the
literature is that children use tensed forms before they are able to engage in
temporal decentering, i.e., before they are capable of forming the notion of
other times as alternative temporal perspectives on which grasp of the idea
of a reference time depends. What is more controversial is whether children
who are thus unable to employ reference time in their uses of tensed forms
can still be recognized as marking relations between speech time and event
time, as mature users of tense do, or whether they must be seen as marking
a completely different set of facts.
Thus, the defective tense hypothesis maintains that initial use of tense mor-
phology does not actually involve reference to past, present, or future times
at all: Rather, tense encodes aspectual features (see Bronckhart & Sinclair,
1973, for an early expression of this claim). Aspect distinguishes between
events not on the basis of the time at which they happen, as tense does, but
on the basis of their internal temporal contour (Comrie, 1985). In English, for
example, the contrast between ‘‘John is singing’’ and ‘‘John was singing’’ is
one of tense (present vs past), whereas the distinction between ‘‘John was
singing’’ and ‘‘John sang’’ is one of aspect (continuing vs completed). The
central claim of the defective tense hypothesis is that children initially pro-
duce the past tense to mark the completion of an event rather than to locate
it in the past. Some studies (e.g., Antinucci & Miller, 1976; Bloom, Lifter, &
Hafitz, 1980; Rispoli & Bloom, 1985) had indicated that, at least until the
age of 3, use of past tense is limited to achievement and accomplishment
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verbs, which describe events with a definite point of completion (e.g., ‘‘draw-
ing a circle,’’ ‘‘winning the match’’), whereas activity verbs (e.g., ‘‘swim-
ming’’) are always used in the progressive tense (see Vendler, 1957, for this
terminology). This has been taken to imply that ‘‘the children are focusing
on the result of the event described by the verb . . . As a result of the change
denoted by a transitive verb, the object comes to be in a state; for example
the action described by somebody broke the toy results in the state the toy
is broken’’ (Antinucci & Miller, 1976, p. 172). Since the child’s thinking is
restricted to the perspective of the present, she can consider past events only
insofar as they manifest themselves in present results.
Several authors have disputed the existence of the kind of empirical evi-
dence put forward by the defenders of the defective tense hypothesis. Spe-
cifically, it has been claimed that children, in fact, start using the past tense
with activity verbs at the same time as they start using it with achievement
and accomplishment verbs—toward the end of the second year (Smith, 1980;
Smith & Weist, 1987; Weist, 1989). It has, therefore, been argued that chil-
dren at this stage have a primitive tense system which, like the adult system,
is used to coordinate speech time and event time. We will call this the primi-
tive tense hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, both the aspect and tense
system are initially quite limited, because there is, as yet, no ability to use
a reference time which might be different from the speech time. Thus, for
example, children at this stage are not able to conceptualize events as ongo-
ing-in-the-past and, therefore, to use the past progressive (Weist, 1986), and
the use of tenses is restricted to marking the relation between event time
and speech time simply in terms of simultaneity or sequence. Nevertheless,
according to Smith (1980, p. 265), the primitive tense system ‘‘gives a pre-
cise meaning for pastness: pastness in the child’s system indicates a time
anterior to speech time.’’ This has been taken to imply that, before they are
able to decenter in time, children already have a capacity for displacement:
That is, an ability to locate events in the past, independently of whether these
past events have resulted in a present, observable state or not. Crucially for
present purposes, Weist (1989) has argued that it is the capacity for displace-
ment which manifests possession of episodic memories.
The crucial difference between the defective tense hypothesis and the
primitive tense hypothesis, as we have described them, lies in the kind of
representations that children are claimed to be able to entertain before acquir-
ing the capacity to decenter and to conceive of other times as affording differ-
ent temporal perspectives. In order to count as drawing a genuine distinction
between present and past, the child would need to have some way to repre-
sent events even though they are no longer going on. As Weist (1989, p. 69)
points out: ‘‘If, at this phase of development, ‘out of sight’ still meant ‘out
of mind,’ there would be no representation to retrieve.’’ How the accounts
differ is in terms of whether children at this stage are thought to represent past
events as past events. However, although the accounts generate different
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empirical predictions, the empirical evidence seems far from decisive. We now
wish to suggest that there is a different, theoretical consideration which an
account of children’s early perspectival temporal representations must meet.
Earlier, we discussed a certain form of nonperspectival representation
which children may also be thought to possess before they acquire the ability
to decenter in time, namely, scripts. We pointed out that scripts can only be
put to use by a child who is able to integrate the nonperspectival information
provided by the script with perspectival information. In other words, to put
a script to use, the child must be able to keep track of where she is in the
unfolding sequence instantiating the script. The nonperspectival information
provided by the script must have a counterpart in the perspectival information
available to the child as she executes the script. Script execution can, there-
fore, be seen as providing further evidence of the perspectival representa-
tional frameworks available to children before they can engage in temporal
decentering, i.e., at the same developmental stage that we have been dis-
cussing with regard to children’s early use of tense. This evidence, however,
suggests that children’s abilities to form perspectival temporal representa-
tions at this stage may be less limited than suggested by the defective tense
hypothesis and more limited than suggested by the primitive tense hypoth-
esis.
Saying that the nonperspectival information provided by the script must
have a counterpart in the perspectival information available to the child as
she executes the script means that the child must be able to represent ele-
ments of the to-be-executed script other than the one currently being exe-
cuted. Thus, what we have here is precisely a case in which events in the
sequence which are ‘‘out of sight,’’ because they have already taken place
or are as yet to happen, must not be ‘‘out of mind,’’ or else the child would
be unable to progress through the sequence determined by the script. More-
over, the child’s ability to execute a script seems to entail that she can form
perspectival representations of any kind of event that can occur in the script,
not just those with observable consequences in the present, as the defective
tense hypothesis suggests. Conversely, however, a child’s ability to execute
a script can provide evidence for perspectival representations only of those
events that are part of the currently executed script, e.g., of events that hap-
pened earlier during a typical school day (Sachs, 1983). In the next section,
we wish to show that this entails that the child may not yet have a notion
of the particular times at which these events happen, since it may be unable
to distinguish the present instantiation of the script from past or future ones.
If this is true, it casts doubt on the claim made by proponents of the primitive
tense hypothesis that children at this stage are already able to form episodic
memories of events. This is because they may still lack the notion of the
particular time when an event happened, which we take to be a necessary
ingredient of a genuine episodic memory.
Where does this leave the question of whether children’s initial use of
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tenses can be seen as marking the relation between speech time and event
time, or whether they should be seen as marking aspectual features? We
suggest that the most parsimonious account of children’s representational
abilities at this early stage, before they acquire the ability to decenter in time,
is to interpret these abilities as a way of imposing aspectual features on
events. In other words, children impose a perspective on the unfolding of
events in as far as, at any given point in time, they classify some events as
completed (even if they may not have a natural point of completion), using
the past tense inflection, whereas they think of other events as ongoing. In
this sense, aspectual distinctions do indeed influence the course of the acqui-
sition of tense distinctions, though it is less clear whether one would still
want to call such a use of tense markers ‘‘defective’’ (see Bloom & Harner,
1989, for a similar view). Moreover, this interpretation does not predict that
children should initially be unable to form the past tense of activity verbs.
Early use of tensed forms, according to this interpretation, is limited only
in that it is event-based: It is based on children’s experience with familiar
event sequences, and the perspective it introduces is a perspective determined
by their view on the status of events in those sequences, such as whether
they are ongoing or completed. Others have already emphasized the role of
scripts and event knowledge in the acquisition of new verbs (Aktar & Toma-
sello, 1996; Tomasello & Kruger, 1992). Here, we are claiming that such
knowledge provides the foundation for early use of tensed forms (see Nelson,
1996, for a related claim). Since such early use is event-based, it does not
supply the child with any means to think about the times at which the events
in any given occurrence of the script happen that is independent of her fol-
lowing through the script.
REPRESENTATION OF RECURRENT TEMPORAL FEATURES
AND PARTICULAR TIMES
Campbell (1994) has made a crucial distinction between what he has
termed ‘‘temporal orientation with respect to phase’’ and ‘‘temporal orienta-
tion with respect to particular times.’’ The former involves locating events
with respect to the phase of a recurrent temporal sequence. There are many
naturally occurring temporal sequences which are organized cyclically,
which means that the end of one instantiation of the sequence coincides with
the beginning of another: Examples are days, lunar cycles, and years. A
considerable body of research has established that many animals, including
humans, adjust their behavior to the state of such cycles. Other recurring
temporal cycles with which we are familiar may be more arbitrary and can be
thought of as social conventions, for example, weeks and months. Moreover,
recurring sequences need not be cyclical in order for us to be able to adjust
our behavior to their unfolding. We have already said that scripts represent
familiar sequences that often occur many times (e.g., what happens at a visit
to the doctor), although they do not necessarily recur at regular intervals.
TEMPORAL FRAMEWORKS 167
When recurrent sequences are used as a method of location, events are
located with respect to the particular phase or state of the sequence at which
they occur. So, for example, an event may be located with respect to the
season of the year, the day of the week, or the point in the typical school
day. However, locating an event in this way does not necessarily also involve
locating it in any particular occurrence of that type of sequence: An event
may be assigned a location, for example, in terms of the time of the day at
which it occurs, without being assigned to any day in particular. Campbell
(1994, p. 38) described this possibility as follows: ‘‘Consider an animal that
hibernates. Through the part of the year for which it is awake, it regulates
its activity depending on the season . . . But it may not have the conception
of the seasons as particular times; it may be incapable of differentiating be-
tween the autumn of one year and the autumn of another.’’ An event which
is located only within a recurrent sequence is not though of as an episode.
Indeed, if a creature is, say, unable to assign events to unique points in time,
rather than merely to seasons in a year, we would not credit it with a proper
grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future since it lacks the
conceptual abilities to distinguish between the current year and others.
Campbell argued that the ability to locate events within recurrent se-
quences is more primitive in the evolutionary sense than the ability to locate
events at particular points in time. The obvious issue is whether this is also
the case with respect to human development. One possible approach to this
question is to assume that representing recurrent sequences is the develop-
mental primitive, and that representing particular times emerges with increas-
ing sophistication in representing sequences (e.g., increasingly longer or
more abstract recurrent sequences).
Representing Recurrent Sequences
In their characterization of sequential behavior, Brown and Vousden
(1998) have argued that even relatively primitive organisms, such as insects,
demonstrate temporally organized behaviors that can be thought of as inter-
nally generated. In line with Gallistel (1990), they suggested that oscillator-
based systems provide an animal with a way of being sensitive to the phase
of various cycles. Oscillator systems function as timekeeping mechanisms
and can be thought of as internal clocks. To provide useful functions, the
internal clock system needs to be entrained by events in the world, by associ-
ating particular states of the internal clock with particular behaviors. For
example, an animal may associate one particular food location with one time
(i.e., state or phase of the oscillator system), a different location with a later
time and so on, which enables it to turn up at a series of locations at the
appropriate times of the day.
Clearly, temporally organized behavior and the representation of recurrent
cycles even in young children is more sophisticated than in animals, although
it is likely that much of the temporally organized behavior shown by human
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babies, such as feeding cycles, is similar to that described above and exploits
similar mechanisms. Indeed, Brown and Vousden argued that human mem-
ory for sequences, such as recurrent sequences of events, has much in com-
mon with these more primitive kinds of animal behavior and relies on oscilla-
tor-based systems. However, they have also discussed ways in which the
behavior of animals is limited and may differ from that of humans. Some of
these ways are essentially quantitative, and can be thought of as ‘‘hardware’’
limitations in the oscillator system. Many animals are restricted in terms of
the lengths of the periods of time to which they can adjust their behavior—
bees, for example, do not seem to be able to entrain oscillators to periods
greater than 24 hours. Humans are much more flexible in the lengths of
periods of time that they are capable of representing.
Two further limitations are more qualitative in nature. Brown and Vousden
point out that adult humans can decouple sequential behavior from the world,
whereas this may not be the case for at least some animals. Animals, although
capable of producing internally generated sequential behavior in the sense
of not being reliant on external cues, have internal temporal representations
which remain coupled to their environment. Human behavior, by contrast,
is internally generated in a stronger sense. First, although some of our tempo-
rally organized behavior is entrained to external rhythms (e.g., daily or circa-
dian rhythms), we also impose on our experience temporal structures which
are more arbitrary. Further, we can decide to retrieve many behavioral se-
quences or representations of event sequences at will.
Another important way in which representations of recurrent sequences
may become more sophisticated is in the extent to which they are organized
hierarchically. For example, a representation of the series of events involved
in a typical school day could also figure as a component of a representation
of the typical school week, which could, in turn, figure in a component of
a more extended period. Research on human memory for sequential informa-
tion has shown that it does indeed have this hierarchical character, with tem-
poral information about a given event being represented at numerous differ-
ent levels of such a hierarchy (see Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988,
for evidence of hierarchical organization in autobiographical memory, and
Nairne, 1991, for somewhat shorter-term memory). Thus, in adults, represen-
tations of recurrent event sequences are embedded in complex ways within
other event sequences.
These considerations of the way in which representations of recurrent se-
quences become more sophisticated could be cast in developmental terms.
First, development could involve a transition from externally to internally
generated sequential behavior, with the retrieval or reinstatement of se-
quences coming under voluntary control. With development, representations
of recurrent temporal sequences could become more arbitrary and flexible.
Second, representations of recurrent sequences, such as what happens at a
typical meal, during a day at nursery school, in a school week etc., could
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gradually acquire a hierarchical organization as children acquire increasingly
abstract scripts within which other scripts could become embedded (Fivush,
1984; Ratner, Smith, & Padgett, 1990).
From Recurrent Sequences to Particular Times
We now have a conception of how representations of recurrent sequences
could become more sophisticated with development. Would possession of
the kinds of cognitive resources we have described imply that a child is
representing events as occurring at particular points in time? It is possible
that even if a child has such resources, she may still fail to think of events
as occurring at particular points in time. Even if they do form the develop-
mental basis for a temporal framework which can represent particular times,
more is needed to explain why mechanisms which were initially used to
represent recurrent sequences are then put to work in this way. This is clear
if we consider the limited function that temporal representations of recurrent
sequences serves (see Campbell, 1994; Friedman, 1993).
For example, Katherine Nelson (1990, p. 308) has argued, ‘‘The most
basic general function for memory . . . is to provide guidance for action.
What has happened is used as the basis for predicting what will come next.
For this purpose the most useful type of evidence comes from events that
are frequently repeated, and thus the most useful . . . type of memory is that
for familiar routine events, the type of generalized event memory realized
as scripts.’’ To fulfill this function, even memories that actually derive from
individual episodes should not be represented as such, but as potentially reoc-
curring events. Indeed, the fact that children will extract scriptlike representa-
tions even after a single experience suggests that this often happens (Fivush,
Hudson, & Nelson, 1984).
The limitations of the practical understanding underlying these early repre-
sentations of time may be made clearer if we consider how representations
of space may be limited in an analogous way. One can imagine a primitive
form of spatial reasoning which enables the child to think about the locations
of two different objects within two different rooms without having any single
way of locating the objects or understanding how the rooms are located rela-
tive to each other. The same could be true of early temporal frameworks:
In the child’s system, different events may be represented as part of two
thematically unrelated recurrent sequences, and the child may not yet grasp
the temporal relation between the events or the sequences in which they
occur. Of course, as was suggested earlier, children’s knowledge of recurrent
sequences will gradually acquire a hierarchical organization such that the
relationships between thematically related event sequences become repre-
sented. For example, the sequence of eating lunch at nursery school may
become located within the higher-order sequence of the daily nursery school
routine. However, there may still be no way of locating thematically unre-
lated sequences of events with each other. Indeed, many sequences of events
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do not have a consistent temporal relation with each other: For instance,
visits to the doctor do not occur consistently on the same day of the week.
When such relations are arbitrary, they do not have the kind of predictive
value provided by representations of recurrent sequences.
Adults have quite different representations, such as the conventional clock
and calendar system, which provide a single framework within which each
event can be assigned a unique location, irrespective of its thematic relations
to other events. But it is difficult to see how acquisition of such a framework
could be the result of a mere increase in sophistication of representations of
the kinds described so far, which rely on the fact that numerically different
sequences of events can fall under the same representation. In the concluding
section, we say more about this transition from representing recurrent se-
quences to representing particular times with regard to the kinds of decen-
tering abilities involved, and thus the relation between the development of
memory and self-consciousness.
THE EMERGENCE OF EPISODIC MEMORY: TEMPORAL
DECENTERING
The basic distinctions between frameworks which are perspectival or non-
perspectival and those which locate events with respect to recurrent temporal
features or particular times have enabled us to put together a picture of how
an understanding of time may develop from very basic ways of being respon-
sive to temporal features of the environment. Findings from deferred imita-
tion tasks indicate that early in development (within the first 18 months),
infants have temporally organized representations of familiar action se-
quences and can acquire novel temporally ordered representations through
observation. However, such representations may not yet be abstractions that
can function as temporal frameworks—that is, they cannot be used to locate
novel events. The earliest temporal frameworks make use of representations
similar to those used in deferred imitation, in that they typically involve
familiar event sequences. However, they are more abstract insofar as they
allow variability in terms of what happens at any given occurrence of the
event sequence. As such, they seem to require the ability to distinguish be-
tween the position in the sequence at which an event happens and the event
itself. It may be useful to think of this process of abstraction as part of what
is involved in the internalization and decoupling of temporal representations
from temporal regularities in the world. Such decoupling allows representa-
tions of recurrent temporal sequences to be more arbitrary (not simply re-
flecting temporal regularities in the world) and flexible.
These primitive temporal frameworks have a number of key properties.
First, they involve an understanding of time which is event-based or as-
pectual in nature. Although this early understanding of time has both per-
spectival and nonperspectival ingredients, the perspective on time is quite
different from our adult one. We have argued that perspective here is a matter
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of keeping track of which events have been completed and which are ongoing
or yet to happen, rather than a matter of grasping relations between the pres-
ent time and points of time in the past and the future. The second, related,
property is that such frameworks only allow events to be located with respect
to recurrent sequences rather than particular times. Because of this second
property, this early temporal reasoning provides a way of locating events
which is fragmented into localized frames: events are located with respect
to particular event sequences, rather than within one unified temporal frame-
work which also relates events with each other that are not thematically con-
nected.
At any rate, even though the child’s reasoning at this stage may encompass
quite a lot more than what happens ‘‘here and now,’’ it will still be subject
to a very fundamental constraint. The kinds of representations we have
looked at so far are centered on the child’s actual perspective in time. In
other words, at this stage, children may be able to represent events happening
at different times but their reasoning about these events is still constrained
since they can only consider them insofar as they have a bearing on what
happens ‘‘here and now.’’
Decentering and Early Narratives
In the second or third year, children’s narratives show evidence for the
development of a new capacity to decenter, where decentering means being
able to conceive of other times as affording alternative temporal perspectives.
Whereas scripts are merely descriptions of the way things usually go but do
not involve grasp of specific contexts other than the speech context, these
narratives give a description of an event sequence which is explicitly under-
stood to be unfolding in a different context. To a certain degree, the child
is able to decenter to that other context. Take the following example of a 2-
year-old’s fictional narrative from Antinucci & Miller (1976, p. 186): ‘‘One
day the white sheep was going along the street. Then the white sheep said:
‘The wolf, the bad wolf comes.’ Then the wolf said: ‘Come, come.’ ’’ This
kind of narration involves a switch in perspective in that the child is not
confused about what is actually happening and what is happening in the
fictional setting, and she can begin the narrative at the appropriate point and
work through it in a temporal sequence (Nelson, 1996). The context in which
the narrated events are taken to unfold is introduced by the adverbial expres-
sion ‘‘one day,’’ though, in this case, this is meant to indicate a fictional
rather than just a different temporal context. The switching in perspective
from the actual speech context to this other context is clear from the way
the tense of the characters’ utterances is made appropriate to the narrative:
The narrative itself is given in the past tense, but the tense of the sheep’s
utterance could be construed as future or present.
We think that this early kind of decentering can be understood as being
analogous to the abilities involved in early pretense. Numerous authors have
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argued that in early pretense children can switch perspectives without a
proper grasp of the relation between the pretend and actual perspective,
namely, that they are different ways of thinking about the same object (Har-
ris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith, & Boucher, 1994; Perner,
1991). For example, they can switch from the representation ‘‘This is a ba-
nana’’ to a representation ‘‘This is a telephone,’’ and, hence, pretend that
the banana is a telephone without representing the nature of relation between
these representations (i.e., without representing ‘‘I am pretending of the ba-
nana ‘This is a telephone’ ’’). Our claim is that early narratives of nonpresent
event sequences might also be understood in this way, and, as such, are best
described as a form of decentering that involves perspective-switching rather
than perspective-taking. In this sense, a child can have the ability to switch
temporal perspective without being able to reason about the nature of the
relation between different perspectives.
Children at this early stage of narrative production seem to have an incipi-
ent grasp of pastness, and thus of the fact that certain events they recount
happened anterior to the speech context. However, there is still a decisive
difference between the kind of temporal decentering they are capable of and
the temporal decentering involved in mature episodic memory. Thus, in her
study of monologues of the 2-year-old, Emily, Gerhardt (1989, p. 203) ob-
served that Emily’s initial use of past morphology ‘‘is indeed chosen to mark
the deictic relation of pastness, but in a very restricted context. Rather than
describe a single, isolated past event, she refers to events that are part of a
larger event structure.’’ Even though the child is now able to switch perspec-
tive to things that happened in the past, her reasoning is still event-based
insofar as it is only because of the interrelation between the events in the
narrative that individual events can be ordered. By the same token, the child’s
way of locating these events in time is still localized. As Gerhardt (1989,
p. 204) puts it, ‘‘there is no evidence that she can yet interrelate different
event frames or freely interpolate events within these frames.’’ There is no
reason to suppose that the child is working with a unified temporal frame-
work that would allow events which are not thematically related to be or-
dered in time.
Such an ability to interrelate arbitrary events, however, seems to be one
of the things that is required if one is to have a notion of the particular time
at which the narrated events happened. This is not to say that one only has
a notion of the particular times at which two events happened if one is actu-
ally able to order them in time. However, even if we, as adults, are unsure
of the order of two remembered events, we believe there is a fact of the
matter as to which happened first. And it is hard to see how a child could
be said to be thinking about the events she recounts as having happened at
a particular time at all unless she also grasps that there is a fact of the matter
as to whether the events happened before or after certain other events she
remembers.
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Decentering and Self-Consciousness
We have been providing a developmental account of a kind of temporal
understanding, possession of a concept of particular times, that we believe
is involved in episodic memory. However, as mentioned in the first section,
other theoretical accounts of episodic memory have also claimed that epi-
sodic memory involves a particular kind of self-conscious activity (Wheeler
et al., 1997). In fact, both of these properties of episodic memory may be
related. This becomes clear if episodic memory is thought of as involving
temporal decentering which goes beyond the perspective-switching de-
scribed above. The notion of decentering in a domain has been more com-
monly used to describe kinds of spatial rather than temporal perspective-
taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956, though see Cromer, 1971). In the spatial
case, the connection between the self-conscious nature of decentering and
the kind of representation of spatial domain that it involves seems clear. It
could be suggested that the ability to consider multiple perspectives on a
spatial layout requires a detached view of one’s own perspective as one
among many, and, hence, a kind of self-consciousness. Further, this ability
seems to involve having a relatively sophisticated way of representing space
which supports this kind of activity (see Newcombe, 1989, for a review of
this research). Once episodic memory is viewed as an activity involving per-
spective-taking or decentering in time, a similar connection can be made
between the kind of self-consciousness and the way of representing time
that it involves. A number of theorists have also discussed the role of self-
consciousness in their accounts of autobiographical memory development,
although they have not connected this with temporal understanding (Fivush,
Haden, & Adam, 1995; Howe & Courage, 1997). However, since these theo-
rists differ markedly from each other in their conceptions of autobiographical
memory, the descriptions they provide of such self-consciousness differ in
terms of whether they are more sophisticated than the self-consciousness we
will claim is involved in episodic memory (for example, Fivush’s, 1997,
description can be contrasted with that of Howe & Courage, 1993).
Spatial decentering tasks measure children’s ability to comprehend per-
spectival representations of an array of objects as seen from an arbitrary
vantage point which differs from the one they actually occupy. Children who
succeed in such tasks can be said not only to be able to switch between
perspectives, but also to have a conception of those perspectives as perspec-
tives onto the same spatial reality, and an understanding of the systematic
relationships that obtain between these perspectives in virtue of this fact.
This kind of understanding, which Flavell (e.g., Flavell, Green, & Flavell,
1989) has labeled Level 2 perspective-taking, has been described as mentalis-
tic (Perner, 1991), since part of what it involves is an understanding of the
perspectival nature of visual experience itself and how it is determined by
one’s position relative to a spatial array.
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We wish to suggest that temporal decentering, if it is to be more than the
perspective-switching described above, must similarly involve a conception
of temporal perspectives as perspectives onto the same temporal reality and
an understanding of the systematic relations that obtain between different
temporal perspectives in virtue of this fact. Understanding that there can be
multiple temporal perspectives on the same event, for example, involves be-
ing able to reason that a current ongoing event will be in the past from the
perspective of subsequent days and was in the future from the perspective
of previous days. Thus, just as Level 2 spatial perspective-taking involves
understanding that how an object looks is dependent on one’s perspective,
its temporal equivalent involves understanding that that the way one is think-
ing about events is dependent on one’s perspective in time. Just as in the
spatial case, temporal perspective-taking involves mentalizing abilities. Spe-
cifically, it could be argued that it involves the ability to conceive of oneself
as the possessor of mental states which depend on one’s temporal perspec-
tive. This can be contrasted with more primitive kinds of self-consciousness,
which do not yet involve thinking of oneself as a possessor of mental states,
such as those measured by mirror self-recognition.
In emphasizing the role of mentalizing here, our account is related to that
of Perner, who has argued that such abilities are necessary for episodic mem-
ory. There is, however, a second feature to the type of self-consciousness
involved in episodic memory, which is not yet accommodated by the mere
notion of mentalizing. It seems that, in the temporal case, what underpins
the grasp of the systematic relations between different temporal perspectives
is an awareness of oneself as the occupier of these different perspectives,
i.e., of oneself as temporally extended (Neisser, 1991; Povinelli et al., 1996;
Povinelli & Simon, 1998). Whereas spatial decentering of the kind we have
described can be understood as an ability to construct alternative perspectives
on the basis of the perceptual information currently available (as perspectives
one could, but need not occupy), temporal perspective-taking is only possible
because one has actually occupied other temporal perspectives and is able
to conceive of them as perspectives that one has occupied (see Campbell,
1994, 1997, for more detailed analyses). In other words, temporal perspec-
tive-taking or decentering, as we have described it, is associated with a grasp
of the fact that there were previous points in time at which one’s temporal
perspective on events was quite different but one’s own nonetheless.
Future Directions for Research
A new account of the development of children’s understanding of time has
been provided, one that links such understanding with memory development.
Most previous research on temporal understanding in children has been in
the Piagetian tradition (see Levin, 1992, for a review of this research). That
tradition focuses on a specific and sophisticated kind of temporal reasoning,
namely, grasp of the relationships between speed, distance, and duration.
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There has been little empirical research on children’s concepts of time out-
side of that tradition, perhaps because it is not straightforward to generate
appropriate methodologies for use with young children. Although it is diffi-
cult to assess children’s concepts of time directly, we finish by showing how
our account provides a way of interpreting a variety of existing empirical
findings in terms of children’s understanding of time, and how it can also
be used to generate some directions for future research.
Deferred imitation. We have argued that although deferred imitation stud-
ies demonstrate that young children can represent event sequences, early in
development, such sequences may not yet function as temporal frameworks.
A clear prediction of this claim is that infants may have difficulty using
such representations flexibly as a means of representing the location of novel
events. Most of the existing deferred imitation studies on the flexible use of
event representations have varied the props provided for use in behavioral
reenactment. For example, Bauer and Dow (1994) have shown that children
aged between 16 and 20 months will reenact previously demonstrated event
sequences, even when provided with an entirely novel set of props (see also
Bauer & Fivush, 1992; Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992). We agree with Bauer
and Dow that such findings demonstrate some degree of generalization of
event representations: Children must have sufficiently general descriptions
or representations of the event sequence such that various objects could be
used to carry out the actions specified in the sequence. However, demonstra-
tions of such generalization fall short of showing that such event representa-
tions can be used as frameworks to provide locations for novel elements.
To show this, the components (i.e., the target actions) of the demonstrated
sequences themselves must be varied rather than the props. Although studies
of 3- and 4-year-olds’ recall of stories or events have examined the effects
of varying such components (e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1990; Fivush et al.,
1992; Kuebli & Fivush, 1994), we are not aware of any deferred imitation
studies with infants which have done so. Our suggestion is that, if novel
components are inserted into an event sequence, early in development chil-
dren may not show evidence of using a pre-existing temporal representation
as a framework to represent their location. Rather, they may simply form a
separate new representation of the presented event sequence or ignore the
novel component.
With development, children should become capable of applying existing
event sequences in situations in which not all the original elements are pres-
ent, or in which novel elements are added. This development may have wide-
ranging implications for children’s performance on tasks requiring the re-
cruitment or modification of a previously acquired action sequence. For ex-
ample, Zelazo, Reznick, and Spinazzola (1998) found that even 2-year-olds
have difficulty with multistep multilocation tasks in which one step of a
previously acquired action sequence must be modified to successfully re-
trieve a reward. Although performance on this task is determined by a num-
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ber of other factors, such as levels of response inhibition, Zelazo et al.
pointed out that one requirement of the task is ‘‘analyzing practiced behav-
ioral routines into separate steps and modifying an intermediate step’’
(p. 212). Such flexible use of event representations may develop later than
the ability to accurately reproduce event sequences.
Localized temporal frameworks. It has been argued that, even by around
2 or 3 years when children are using sequential event representations as tem-
poral frameworks, such frameworks are limited in that they are localized.
In other words, there is no grasp of the systematic temporal relations that
obtain between thematically unrelated events. This account makes a number
of predictions with regard to children’s memory. First, although early mem-
ory narratives may describe the particular components of an event in the
appropriate temporal sequence, such sequences may not be temporally linked
with other events which happened on different occasions. This lack of a
grasp of the temporal relations between occurrences at different times should
be reflected in children’s early uses of temporal terms and tensed verb forms.
Thus, there should be a developmental stage in which such linguistic forms
are used correctly to describe the relations between components of a given
event sequence but not yet used to mark the temporal relations between dif-
ferent events.
Since, at this stage, children do not grasp the temporal relations between
arbitrary points in time, they would be expected to perform poorly on mem-
ory tasks which explicitly require judgments about the temporal order of
different life events. In fact, in a series of studies, Friedman has assessed
children’s memory and understanding of such temporal relations. Typically,
he has used relative recency judgment tasks in which children are asked of
two life events ‘‘Which one happened a long time ago and which one hap-
pened a short time ago?’’ (Friedman, 1991, 1992; Friedman, Gardner, &
Zubin, 1995; Friedman & Kemp, 1998). Friedman has found that, by 4 years
of age, children are above chance at making such relative recency judgments
for some kinds of events. His findings suggest that, at least by this age,
children can think about the temporal relations between episodes, rather than
simply being able to sequence the components of a single episode. However,
although he has included children as young as 2 and 3 years in some of his
studies, he has not reported on whether performance on such tasks improves
markedly during the preschool years (typically, he has compared a preschool
group with an older group). Further studies on the ability to judge the relative
recency of events could focus in more detail on how such abilities develop
in the early years.
Temporal decentering. We have described the emergence of episodic
memory as involving temporal decentering, and there is some evidence to
suggest that, by 4 or 5 years, this ability is intact. Although it is not straight-
forward to assess this ability empirically, Cromer (1971) has carried out a
study using a task he has described as measuring temporal decentering. His
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task can be interpreted as requiring children to reason about other temporal
perspectives, while having minimal demands on memory. Using a picture-
story format, Cromer examined when children were able to match descrip-
tions of events given in a particular tense with the point in time in which
such descriptions were accurate. For example, the sentence ‘‘I will see the
horses’’ should have been matched with a point in time before the story
character saw the horses. Cromer argued that such matching required chil-
dren to decenter and take up different temporal perspectives on the story
events. The youngest children in Cromer’s study were 5 years of age, and
such children showed some evidence of decentering. A further study which
used a simplified version of Cromer’s task found good performance in 5-
year-olds (Russell, McCormack, Stow, & Parker, 1998).
Although future studies could examine such abilities at younger ages, the
heavily linguistic nature of Cromer’s task makes it unsuitable for very young
children. Also, it is questionable whether this task can be thought of as mea-
suring children’s ability to decenter to past events in their own lives, since
it involves fictional events. In fact, recent research using a quite different
paradigm suggests that 3-year-olds may still have difficulties in reasoning
about other temporal perspectives that they have occupied. Povinelli et al.
(1996) have found that preschoolers fail a delayed self-recognition task, in
which they are shown a video or a photograph of a sticker being placed on
their heads at an earlier time. Although Povinelli et al. argued that their tasks
assess children’s self concept, they may also measure a general ability to
engage in temporal decentering and reason about the relationships between
past and present temporal perspectives. Indeed, Zelazo, Sommerville, and
Nichols (in press) have shown that 3-year-olds seem to have more global
problems reasoning about representations of past situations and using infor-
mation from such representations to guide their current behavior. Future re-
search could examine the relationship between performance on such tempo-
ral perspective-taking tasks and children’s memory (e.g., their ability to make
relative recency judgments about the relationships between past events). In-
deed, one study has already found such a relationship: Skene (1996) found
that performance on a delayed recognition task was correlated with the ability
to make judgments about the relative order of some events, even when age
was partialed out.
Temporal decentering and memory sharing. Once the development of epi-
sodic memory is described in terms of the emergence of temporal decen-
tering, it seems clear that memory sharing may play a crucial role in its
development (e.g., Fivush & Reese, 1991; Hudson, 1990). Just as the kind
of perspective-switching that occurs in early pretend play first occurs in a
social setting, so may the kind of perspective-switching that occurs in early
memory retrieval. Indeed, it may be adults who normally (but not always,
as Emily’s monologues demonstrate; Nelson, 1989) initiate this kind of per-
spective-switching by prompting the child with cues about specific past
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events. Through the experience of sharing memories, such as different mem-
ories of the same past event, children may then begin to conceive of such
memories as involving alternative perspectives in time that they once occu-
pied. In this respect, our account is compatible with a variety of findings
which suggest that social sharing of memories is important in the develop-
ment of memory narratives (Haden, Haine, & Fivush, 1997; Hudson, 1990;
Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1993). Further, we have described such perspec-
tive-taking in time as self-conscious since it has a mentalistic component,
and, indeed, a recent study by Welch-Ross (1997) has found relationships
between mentalizing abilities and children’s engagement in talk about the
past with their parents. Since we view perspective-taking in time as involving
a particular kind of temporal understanding (a conception of particular past
times), social sharing of memories and mentalizing can thus be thought of
as being important for the development of children’s concepts of time. There-
fore, we might expect to see relationships between children’s social experi-
ences, their mentalizing abilities, and their ability to reason about the rela-
tionships between points in time.
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